Social Contract for Ukraine: A Renewed Perspective in the Context of War – Column by Denis Poltavets, Director of Program Development, the Aspen Institute Kyiv, for  Lb.UA

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression, it has become clear that the old notions of the relationship between the state and its citizens need rethinking. What is commonly referred to as the “social contract” — a formal or informal agreement regarding the distribution of responsibilities and rights between the state and society — had long been shaped by post-Soviet practices. The state was expected to provide minimal welfare guarantees, yet trust in institutions remained low, shadow schemes were widespread, and citizens often lacked real influence on decision-making.

The war radically changed these conditions: security, national defence, and the mobilization of all resources came to the forefront. It became evident that citizens could not remain passive, and the state required genuine partnership with society. This prompts a reassessment of the social contract concept and the development of new rules of engagement — rules in which essential rights and freedoms are protected, and each side understands its role and responsibility.

This essay explores the idea of a renewed social contract, presenting key proposals that summarize a series of dialogues held by the Aspen Institute Kyiv with Ukrainian leaders from diverse sectors and regions from 2022 to 2024.

A Brief Overview of Theoretical Foundations

The idea of the social contract originates in the works of Enlightenment thinkers. In his theory, Thomas Hobbes emphasized that in the “state of nature,” humans live in a condition of “war of all against all.” Therefore, individuals voluntarily surrender some of their rights to the state in exchange for security and order. In contrast, John Locke argued that the natural state is not total chaos but a space of natural rights to life, liberty, and property. In his view, the state serves as a tool for better protection of these rights, but if it abuses its power, the people have the right to resist.

Meanwhile, Jean-Jacques Rousseau asserted that people come together to form a political body to pursue the “general will,” or the collective good — a process that does not restrict liberty but gives it a new, social dimension.

Although these concepts were developed in a different historical context, they help understand how Ukrainian society is now “making a deal” with the state — in other words, what kind of consensus or new “agreement” is emerging before our eyes. Security concerns have taken on exceptional urgency (in line with Hobbes), but so does the need to preserve civil liberties and maintain oversight of government actions (Locke’s position). Finally, there is a significant demand for collective effort and solidarity (Rousseau’s ideas). The fusion of these elements shapes a uniquely Ukrainian reinterpretation of the social contract amid wartime conditions.

War as a Catalyst for Societal Transformation

Since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2014 — and especially after the 2022 invasion — Ukraine has witnessed an unprecedented surge in volunteerism and civic engagement. Millions of people across the country participated in fundraising, aiding internally displaced persons, and supplying the military with equipment and medicine. This revealed a high level of self-organization and society’s ability to unite rapidly in defence of shared interests.

At the same time, the war deepened existing contradictions and created new ones in some cases. A significant part of the country is in frontline zones or has experienced occupation and destruction; millions have become refugees or internally displaced. This situation exacerbates inequality between those who were forced to flee their homes or lost their livelihoods, and those who, despite the war, maintain relatively stable lives. Many have lost businesses or jobs, while those still employed are burdened with growing tax pressure. Some citizens are resorting to illegal means to avoid mobilization, which demotivates those serving in the armed forces. Such imbalances prompt a reconsideration of the foundations of social policy and mechanisms for supporting vulnerable groups.

Under these circumstances, society demands prompt and effective action from the state. On the one hand, the state must strengthen defence capabilities; on the other, it must ensure social justice and support the economy. Yet citizens also expect transparency, and the line between “strengthening the state” and “excessive centralization” becomes increasingly thin. In this context, the concept of the social contract comes to the forefront: Are people ready to trust the government? And how will they hold it accountable to prevent abuse?

The Ukrainian Context: From a Post-Soviet Contract to a New Agreement

In the Soviet era, the “contract” between individuals and the state was often reduced to a paternalistic exchange: the authorities were expected to provide minimal welfare and protection from external threats, while citizens were not to ask too many questions and were to formally support the “party line.” Much of this legacy remained in independent Ukraine, despite declarations of democratic freedoms and a market economy. The war with Russia has revealed the complete unsuitability of the old model of “mutual non-interference.” The state cannot guarantee even basic security without active civic participation, and citizens, in turn, demand not only defence but fairness, transparency, and honest rules from the state.

Amidst mass mobilization and collective resistance to the aggressor, a demand has emerged for a “contract of responsibility”: the citizen is ready to fight, support the state, pay taxes, and volunteer — but expects the state to be accountable, to allocate resources rationally, to ensure fair competition, and to combat corruption systematically. This becomes the foundation of a new social contract, centred on the idea of partnership, in which both citizens and the state acknowledge mutual dependence and shared responsibility.

To make this “doctrine of partnership” possible in Ukraine’s realities, participants in the Social Contract for Ukraine project seminars propose a series of coordinated measures. These can be grouped roughly as follows:

Institutional Reforms and the Rule of Law

Judicial reform and reform of law enforcement agencies:

• Ensure genuine judicial independence, transparent competitions for judicial appointments, and effective integrity screening.
• Strengthen parliamentary and public oversight mechanisms over the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and other security agencies, especially under martial law.

Anti-corruption institutions:

• Ensure effective implementation of the state anti-corruption policy.
• Introduce automated monitoring systems for public procurement — including military procurement — to minimize abuse.

Data transparency:

• Wherever possible, make socially important information publicly available (e.g., budget spending, contracts, sanction lists) and improve procedures for accessing public information.

Civic Participation and Dialogue

Public consultations and dialogue platforms:

• Support effective platforms at the regional and local levels to discuss key issues — from budget allocation to reconstruction plans for affected regions.
• Initiate large-scale public hearings on postwar reforms (economic, educational, administrative).

E-democracy:

• Expand tools for electronic petitions, consultations, and voting, allowing citizens to influence the public agenda in real time.
• Expand the range of digital government services, including channels for quick and effective feedback from government institutions.

Support for civil society organizations:

• Introduce preferential conditions for NGOs implementing humanitarian, educational, or veteran-focused projects.
• Stimulate the development of civic institutions engaged in spending oversight and government accountability.

Economic Modernisation and Social Justice

Transparent business rules:

• Protect property rights and guarantee equal access to resources.
• Simplify permitting procedures and develop digital services for entrepreneurs.
• Provide targeted support to those restoring operations in war-affected regions.

Social protection for veterans and internally displaced persons (IDPs):

• Develop a state assistance program for veterans, including retraining, reintegration into civilian life, and microgrants for starting businesses.
• Establish a housing reconstruction fund for IDPs and launch preferential loan programs for those returning home or settling in new regions.

Enhancing tax system transparency:

• Implement a clear and transparent system of electronic tax reporting; minimize “live” interactions with tax authorities to reduce corruption risks.
• Provide public access to information on budget expenditures (including taxes and military spending).

Development of Human Capital and a Culture of Responsibility

Education and civic upbringing:

• Integrate elements of civic education, critical thinking, a culture of volunteerism, and defence awareness into school and university curricula.
• Support informal education initiatives (seminars, workshops, clubs), encouraging youth civic engagement.

Psychological support and rehabilitation:

• Create a network of psychological support centres for veterans, IDPs, volunteers, and their families.
• Train trauma therapy specialists and integrate international experience in restoring communities affected by war trauma.

Fostering a culture of responsibility:

• Encourage media and public figures to share stories highlighting the value of social initiative, mutual aid, and integrity.
• Promote societal understanding that all contributions — paying taxes, obeying laws, participating in local initiatives — strengthen Ukraine’s collective defence and resilience.

Conclusions

The war has transformed the idea of a social contract from a purely theoretical concept into an urgent practical necessity. The old paternalistic models inherited from Soviet times have been exhausted: security and well-being now depend not only on centralised authority but also on the society’s willingness to self-organise and build effective institutions. At the same time, the state must be prepared to report to its citizens, uphold the game’s rules, and refrain from abusing control mechanisms.

The renewed social contract for Ukraine is, above all, a contract of responsibility and partnership. In this contract:

• The citizen takes on the duty to defend the country — not only with arms, but also through paying taxes, volunteering, and active civic participation — abides by the law, and is prepared to hold the authorities accountable.
• The state guarantees the functioning of fair and transparent institutions, creates conditions for free business development, provides social protection for vulnerable groups, invests in defence, and reports its actions to society.

If this new contract is implemented consistently, it can become the foundation for Ukraine’s post-war recovery, ensure greater cohesion, and open the door to sustainable economic growth. Conversely, remaining in the outdated paradigm of “the state gives, society stays silent” will inevitably lead to reform fatigue, citizen demotivation, continued corruption, and further crises. Therefore, favouring a renewed social contract is not merely beneficial — it is existential for Ukraine’s path to victory and building a viable democracy.

The key formula: “The citizen defends the state — the state defends the citizen.”

In practice, this means mutual trust, responsibility, and respect. This is the idea around which the new Ukraine should be built.

This text was written in 2025 as part of the “Social Contract for Ukraine” project, which was implemented by the Aspen Institute Kyiv with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy and authorized for open publication.